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Abstract
One of the most pressing challenges that occupy the Russellian panpsychist’s agenda is 
to come up with a way to reconcile the traditional argument from categorical proper-
ties (Seager Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(10–11), 129–145, 2006; Alter & 
Nagasawa, 2015) with H. H. Mørch’s dispositionalism-friendly argument from the experi-
ence of causation (2014, Topoi, 39, 1073–1088, 2018, 2020) — on the way to a unitary, 
all-encompassing case for the view. In this regard, Mørch claims that, via the commitment 
to the Identity theory of properties, one can consistently hold both panpsychist arguments 
without contradiction (2020: 281) — I shall refer to such proposal as Reconciliation. In 
my paper, I shall argue that this is not the case. To this extent, I will first consider H. 
Taylor’s argument that the Identity theorists have the exact same resources as the disposi-
tionalists (as, after careful enquiry, their views on the metaphysics of properties turn out 
to coincide (Philosophical Studies, 175, 1423–1440, 2018: 1438)), and thus contend that 
Reconciliation fails to obtain. Then, I will suggest that one can avoid the problem and 
reconcile the arguments by adopting a different version of the powerful qualities view, 
namely the Compound view — and thus advance a reformulated version of the claim, i.e. 
Reconciliation*. Finally, even though pursuing my proposed solution might expose Rus-
sellian panpsychism to the risk of epiphenomenalism, I shall conclude that such specific 
form of epiphenomenalism is a rather benign one, and thus that, via Reconciliation*, the 
constitution of a unitary case for panpsychism as a positive proposal (and not as a mere 
alternative to dualism and physicalism) can be achieved.
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There has been much debate in contemporary philosophy of mind on whether Russel-
lian panpsychism, a newly (re-)discovered position of Russellian heritage, is tenable 
and can be successful in providing a convincing account of mind within a unified con-
ception of nature (Chalmers, 2015; Alter & Nagasawa, 2015) — thus proving better 
than its more traditional and established competitors (namely, dualism and physicalism 
above all) (cf. Goff, 2017). As their view relies on the postulation of (phenomenal) 
categorical properties as the ground of physical reality, one of the major challenges 
that panpsychists have been presented with in recent years is advanced by dispositional-
ists — that is, those who believe that (at least some) properties are essentially dispo-
sitional and do not need any categories to ground them (Mumford, 2006; Bird, 2007; 
Ellis, 2013). Now, in her recent production (cf. 2014, 2018, 2020), H. H. Mørch has 
been arguing  that there can be designed an argument for panpsychism which speaks 
precisely to dispositionalists — even more: an argument that would show that panpsy-
chism actually follows from dispositionalism. In addition to this, she makes a further 
significant claim: she maintains that, by adopting a particular version of the so-called 
powerful qualities view (namely, the Identity view of properties), the panpsychist can, 
at the same time, retain the original subscription to the traditional case for the view 
(which involves categorical properties), while also endorsing her own new disposition-
alism-oriented argument (2014: 55; 2018: 1078; 2020: 281).
This being said, in my paper, I shall address primarily Mørch’s claim that one can 
hold both panpsychist arguments, if she subscribes to the Identity view (which I shall 
refer to as Reconciliation), and argue that it fails to obtain — that is, that one cannot 
achieve the sought reconciliation via the Identity view. Yet, I will show that another 
view (namely, the Compound view), which is part of the same family of theories of the 
Identity view (namely, the Powerful qualities view), can indeed carry out the reconcili-
ation that Mørch envisions — I will call such reformulated version of the claim Recon-
ciliation*. However, even though one can reconcile the two panpsychist arguments via 
the subscription to the Compound view (that is, Reconciliation* is valid), the adoption 
of such an approach to the metaphysics of properties might render Mørch’s original 
argument undesirable — for it will expose her project to the risk of epiphenomenalism. 
This being said, after a careful study of the notions at play, I shall conclude that the 
particular form of epiphenomenalism that one will have to accept to secure the recon-
ciliation is marginal and certainly well worth the pain. In sum, my proposed version of 
Reconciliation* (based on the Compound view of properties) will contribute to equip 
the Russellian panpsychist with an all-encompassing, unitary metaphysical apparatus 
— which will sustain the view as a positive proposal (and not as a mere alternative to 
its more established competitors, i.e. dualism and physicalism).
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2  Panpsychism and Dispositionalism: Status Quaestionis
Before considering Mørch’s arguments and addressing the reconciliation claim, 
we ought to say something more on the positions at play in the debate, namely 
Russellian panpsychism and dispositionalism.
A significant trend in contemporary philosophy of mind focuses on the study of 
the so-called Hard Problem of Consciousness (cf. Chalmers, 1995). In its essential 
form, the problem arises from the age-old intuition that mental stuff and physical 
stuff do not seem to belong together — and thus questions the place of mind within 
our metaphysical story of reality. Traditionally, two candidates have been put forth 
to explain the relationship between mind and body, namely dualism, which sees 
mind and matter as utterly distinct and fundamentally irreducible one to the other 
(cf. Papineau, 2002); and idealism, which moves from the intuition that the only 
thing we can be sure about is the reality of mental life (and thus maintains that one 
should not postulate mind-independent matter). However, both options have signifi-
cant drawbacks: the dualist picture of the world is radically a fragmented one, while 
we should aim at a unified conception of nature; the idealist solution is sceptical, 
while it would be desirable to retain some trust in the observer-independent real-
ity. This being said, in the past century, a third view has gained momentum and has 
now (arguably) imposed itself as the default position in the analytic circles: phys-
icalism (cf. Field, 1972: 357; Stoljar, 2010: 13). The physicalist roughly believes 
that the fundamental level of reality is populated only by purely physical entities 
(cf. Stoljar, 2015) — such that mental phenomena do exist, but are either entirely 
reducible to physical facts or supervene on the physical. Now, in the past 20 years, 
due to the rediscovery of Bertrand Russell’s and Arthur Eddington’s early writings 
(and to the appearance of a number of compelling arguments against physicalism 
(Jackson, 1982, 1986; Chalmers, 1996, 2009)), a fourth candidate has presented 
(better: has returned) on the scene and has been receiving increasing scholarly inter-
est: Russellian Monism. In general, Russellian monism can be defined as the view 
that at the fundamental level of reality there exist some inscrutable properties of a 
single kind, properties which provide ground for physical entities and conscious-
ness alike (cf. Kind, 2015: 404). In its panpsychist fashion, Russellian monism is 
often described as having two main components, namely one positive and one nega-
tive (Goff, 2017: 17). The negative aspect of the view lies in the claim that physical 
science provides us only with a partial account of the nature of the physical world 
(i.e. the extrinsic, dispositional properties of matter), while remaining completely 
silent about the intrinsic, categorical nature of the material — this is what is sup-
posed to motivate the ‘Russellian’ qualification (cf. Stubenberg, 2015). The positive 
component consists of the claim that the hidden, intrinsic nature of matter explains 
phenomenal consciousness — which amounts to say that the ultimate constituents 
of reality are endowed with phenomenal (or protophenomenal) properties. In sum, 
Russellian panpsychism is an anti-idealist monistic view which promises to avoid 
the main difficulties of both dualism and physicalism at once (Chalmers, 2015; Alter 
& Nagasawa, 2015), while providing a convincing account of mind within a unified 
conception of nature (Goff, 2017).
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On the other hand, in the neighbouring field of contemporary metaphysics, phi-
losophers have been debating on the precise nature of properties. Again, two fronts 
can be isolated. One is generally known as categoricalism — where the categorical-
ist believes that all extrinsic/relational/structural properties need some sort of cat-
egorical ground (Russell, 1927; Armstrong, 1997; Lowe, 2006; Seager, 2006). The 
other is often referred to as dispositionalism — where the dispositionalist believes 
that properties are dispositional, such that properties are described in virtue of what 
they dispose their bearers to do (Ellis, 2013: 11). More in detail, within the broad 
spectrum of dispositionalism, two further positions can be identified: a radical posi-
tion (generally known as ‘pure powers view’), that is, the one of those who claim 
that the essence of a property is defined by the nomic role it plays, which amounts 
to say that all properties are essentially dispositional (Shoemaker, 1980; Hawthorne, 
2001; Mumford, 2004, 2006; Bird, 2007, 2013); and a moderate position (often 
called ‘dispositional essentialism’), like the one of those who believe that in order 
to have dispositional properties like causal powers, some more fundamental (cate-
gorical) properties need to be posited (Molnar, 2003; Ellis, 2002, 2013).1 This being 
said, even in the moderate’s case, no random property can serve as the categorical 
base for powers — such that dispositional essentialism is still different from cat-
egoricalism, even though they both make use of categorical properties. In Ellis and 
Molnar’s case, most of the categorical properties that are admitted are dimensions 
— where “dimensions include all of the usual spatial and temporal relations. [.. .] 
[T]he dimensions also include the generic categorical properties of things, including 
shape, size, orientation, handedness, spatio-temporal interval, and so on” (2013: 18). 
According to the two dispositional essentialists, then, the only properties that can be 
rightfully called categorical are those that locate, identify, and orient causal powers 
in space and time — for, given that causal powers are essentially oriented, without 
spatio-temporal categories, there could be no causal powers at all (cf. Molnar, 2003: 
60; Ellis, 2013: 18).
3  H. H. Mørch’s Defence of Panpsychism
Having introduced sufficient background on the positions that are relevant for our 
purposes, let us now consider Mørch’s treatment of Russellian panpsychism. This 
will consist of a new formulation of the traditional argument from categorical prop-
erties, the proposition and discussion of her new argument from the experience of 
causation, and the claim about the reconciliation of the two via the Identity view — 
I shall address the three points in order.
1 What I call ‘radical dispositionalism’ is also known in scholarship as ‘dispositional monism’ (Barker, 
2009), ‘power structuralism’ (Marmodoro, 2019), ‘ontic structural realism’ (Ladyman & Ross, 2007), 
or simply ‘dispositionalism’ (Dumsday, 2019). In my paper, I shall refer to the radical position as ‘pure 
powers view’, while the term ‘dispositionalism’ will be used to indicate general theory which subsumes 
both the radical and the moderate brands.
1 3
Philosophia 
3.1  The Argument for Panpsychism from Categorical Properties
First of all, let us consider the traditional argument for panpsychism, generally 
known as the argument from categorical properties (in the form it is presented and 
discussed by Mørch in her recent production (2020: 280)):
1. Categoricalism: All physical things have categorical properties.
2. Mental categoricity: The only categorical properties whose nature we can know, 
or positively conceive of, are mental properties.
3. Non-skeptical realism: The nature of the categorical properties of physical things 
is knowable or positively conceivable.
Therefore,
4. Panpsychism: All physical things have mental properties.
As we can see, the traditional case for (Russellian) panpsychism appeals to the 
notion of inscrutables, defined as the (categorical) properties that ground the physi-
cal structure that physics describes, and claims that these are in fact phenomenal 
properties (cf. Seager, 2006; Alter & Nagasawa, 2015) — thus elaborating on the 
(already introduced) view that all dispositions must have categorical grounds 
(Categoricalism).
3.2  The Argument for Panpsychism from (the Experience of) Causation
As anticipated, pure powers theorists reject the argument from categorical proper-
ties, as they believe that the essence of a property is exhausted by its causal role 
(Mumford, 2004: 95) — which amounts to say that all properties are essentially dis-
positional. Pure powers theorists thus reject Premise 1 of the argument and hold that 
dispositional properties are irreducible and do not need any categorical properties 
to ground them. On the other hand, dispositional essentialists also would reject the 
argument, as they generally believe that, even though some categorical properties 
are needed to ground causal powers, not all properties can serve as these categori-
cal bases (and certainly not qualitative properties). In sum, as Mørch aptly remarks, 
both dispositionalism (i.e. the pure powers view) and dispositional essentialism 
constitute a challenge to the argument from categorical properties (2014: 54; 2018: 
1077).
Now, instead of arguing against dispositionalism, Mørch aims to appeal to our 
acquaintance with the nature of causation in agency to develop an argument for 
panpsychism that is consistent with the dispositionalist view — showing that, in 
fact, dispositionalism entails panpsychism. Her argument from the experience of 
causation runs as follows (2020: 276):
 I Non-reductionism: All physical things have causal powers.
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 II Mental causation: The only causal powers whose nature we can know, or 
positively conceive of, are mental.
 III Non-skeptical realism: The nature of the causal powers of physical things is 
knowable, or positively conceivable.
Therefore,
 IV Panpsychism: All physical things have mental properties.
The argument from causation starts with the claim that all physical entities have 
irreducibly dispositional properties — which is in line with both the pure powers 
theory and dispositional essentialism, and thus (for our purposes) does not need fur-
ther defence.
As for Mental causation, which constitutes the most central (and controversial) 
premise of the argument, Mørch’s strategy is two-fold. First of all, she needs to 
establish that there are such things as mental causal powers. To this extent, she 
subscribes to the ‘inconceivability principle for causation’, such that causation 
implies a necessary connection between cause and effect which renders it incon-
ceivable that causes do not bring about their effects (and they do so in virtue of 
their essential character) (Mørch, 2014: 102–103; 2018: 1081; 2020: 276). Then, 
she goes on to consider the relationship between motives and efforts (such as the 
relationship between ‘feeling pain’ and ‘trying to avoid it’) and claims that such 
relationship (vis-à-vis the one of voluntary physical action) might qualify as a 
good candidate to meet the standards of causation that are previously set out via 
the principle of inconceivability — in sum, Mørch contends that, if no other power 
interferes, “it is hard to conceive of someone experiencing strong pain, but where 
this does not make them at least try to avoid it” (2020: 278). To the conclusion 
that the property ‘pain’ makes its bearer ‘try to avoid’ it in virtue of its nature, 
that is, of the intrinsic character of the property.2 Secondly, to defend the latter 
2 A word of clarification. Prima facie, it may seem that the claim that it is the phenomenal character of 
pain that disposes us to try to avoid it (such that there is a metaphysical necessitation from the phenom-
enal aspect of pain to the dispositional aspect) is in tension with both the main tenet of the pure powers 
view (that is, that powers do not need grounding) and the indication that dispositional essentialists do 
not allow for phenomenal categorical properties. In this regard, Mørch’s strategy is two-fold. As for the 
radical dispositionalists, she argues that the pure powers view is an incoherent theory altogether (via 
the ‘Pythagorean reductio’ and (Armstrong’s) ‘Always Packing, Never Travelling’ (2018: 1076–1077)), 
and thus that it should not constitute a threat to her claim. Then, concerning the dispositional essen-
tialists (or ‘intrinsicalist dispositionalists’, as she calls them), she suggests that, as they already allow 
for some intrinsic aspects of properties, but they have no positive description for such intrinsic aspects, 
those may well be phenomenal (or partially phenomenal) (cf. 2018: 1077). This being said, leaving aside 
her treatment of the pure powers view, I am not entirely convinced by Mørch’s response to the dispo-
sitional essentialists. In particular, I suspect that Mørch’s claim that the essentialists entirely lack any 
positive characterisation of their proposed categories risks misrepresenting the view in question. In fact, 
if we consider Molnar and Ellis’ case, we can see how the dispositional essentialist offers quite a detailed 
account of her admitted categorical bases: these are mostly dimensions, conceived of as the spatio-tem-
poral locations which are essential to account for the orientedness of powers (that is, those properties 
which “locate, identify and orient them [causal powers] in space and time” (Ellis, 2013: 18)). This is 
to say that the essentialists do, in fact, account for their categories: these are those properties which are 
essential to the existence and functioning of powers — in Ellis and Molnar’s case, dimensions. Again, 
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part of Premise II (that is, we cannot know or positively conceive of non-mental 
causal powers) Mørch claims that, in principle, one could ‘abstract away’ from the 
concept of mental causal power a general concept of (non-mental) causal power, 
which might then be used to account for the physical causal powers that physics 
tells us about (2018: 1084). However, by carrying out such a process of abstrac-
tion, Mørch argues, it is not clear whether we would be left with any positive con-
ception of power (cf. 2014: 114; 2018: 1084–1086; 2020: 278–279) — such that, 
if we lose the phenomenal aspect of them, it seems that the only thing that we 
know about non-mental causal powers is that they are “just like mental powers, 
but non-mental” (2020: 279). Thus, this leaves us with the conclusion that any 
experience that does not present causation as mental, and any account of causation 
that involves non-mental powers, is either deceptive or inaccurate.
Finally, Premise III is partly defended on the basis of Premise II. Mørch claims 
that if there are some causal powers whose intrinsic character we know from our 
phenomenology of motivation and will (that is, mental powers) then we should not 
posit further unknown kinds of powers, provided that our account of mental powers 
already adequately explains our observations. This can be defended by appealing to 
Leibniz’s principle of the continuity of nature, to the qualitative principle of parsi-
mony, or to the general methodological principle that we should not reject a per-
fectly adequate positive account of causation on the basis of the negative theory that 
there may be unknowable powers.
In sum, it is clear that Mørch’s entire argument hangs on the intuition that in our 
phenomenology of will and motivation we truly experience causation (conceived of 
on the basis of the inconceivability principle) — and thus on the claim that (at least 
some) mental properties are essentially dispositional (2020: 277).
3.3  Russellian Panpsychism as a positive proposal: Reconciliation
Given that the “proponents of the argument from categorical properties often 
argue that all mental properties are categorical” and if “categorical and dispo-
sitional properties are indeed opposites” (Mørch, 2020: 280), the argument from 
causation might seem to clash with the argument from categorical properties. 
After all, as already mentioned, the advocates of the argument from categorical 
properties will deny Premise II of the argument from causation, as they would not 
accept that mental properties are dispositional in nature; while pure powers theo-
rists reject Premise 1 of the argument from categorical properties, as they believe 
one might push back and claim that phenomenal properties play in Mørch’s view that same role that 
dimensions play in Molnar and Ellis’ account — as the latter are posited to ground the essential features 
of powers (such as orientedness and directedness), and the former are equally connected to directedness 
(as they necessitate a certain reaction). To this, I would reply that, even though there is a sense in which 
necessitating a specific reaction has to do with the feature of powers of being directed towards a par-
ticular effect, I suspect that spatio-temporal dimensions capture the orientedness of powers in a much 
deeper sense (such that, without spatio-temporal locations to orient them, powers could not exist) — and 
this arguably explains why dispositional essentialists conceive of them as intrinsic and fundamental. This 
all being said, continuing such discussion would take us far away from the main scope of the present 




that there are no categorical properties at all, (and dispositional essentialists deny 
Premise 3 of the same argument, as they tend to resist the idea that phenomenal 
properties can be categorical).
In this direction, in order to accept both arguments, Mørch proposes, follow-
ing Marting & Heil (1999) and Strawson (2008), to drop the assumption that cat-
egorical and dispositional properties are opposite fundamental kinds, and sub-
scribe instead to the Identity view of the metaphysics of properties (Identity view, 
for short). In her recent production, Mørch defines the Identity view as the theory 
that “all properties are necessarily both dispositional and categorical, as opposed 
to purely one or the other” (2018: 1079), and that “all properties necessarily have 
both categorical and dispositional aspects, and that categorical and dispositional 
properties are actually identical” (2020: 281) — we can thus understand the Iden-
tity view as follows:
Identity view: the categoricality and the dispositionality of the property are 
identical, and they exhaust the intrinsic nature of the property — such that, 
categoricality, dispositionality, and the property are all identical.
Thus, she maintains that, by subscribing to the Identity view, one can elegantly 
reconcile the two panpsychist arguments without contradiction (2014: 55; 2018: 
1078; 2020: 281) — we can thus render the reconciliatory attempt as follows:
Reconciliation: if one subscribes to the Identity view, she can hold both 
the argument from categorical properties and the argument from causation 
without contradiction.
The idea behind Reconciliation is that, if we embrace the Identity theory, then 
we will be able to accept both Premise II of the argument from causation and 
Premise 1 of the argument from categorical properties; while if we reject the 
Identity theory and stick to the pure powers view, we will be restricted to the 
argument of causation and the argument from categorical properties will remain 
unacceptable. Therefore, if Reconciliation were true, we would be able to provide 
a unitary defence for panpsychism, which would run roughly as follows:
I. Non-reductionism: All physical things have causal powers.
1. Categoricalism: All physical things have categorical properties.
II. Mental causation: The only causal powers whose nature we can know, or 
positively conceive of, are mental.
2. Mental categoricity: The only categorical properties whose nature we can 
know, or positively conceive of, are mental properties.
III./ 3. Non-skeptical realism*: The nature of the causal powers and of the cat-
egorical properties of physical things is knowable, or positively conceivable.
Therefore,
IV./ 4. Panpsychism: All physical things have mental properties.
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Before moving on, let me emphasise the significance of the enterprise of reconcil-
ing the two panpsychist arguments into one single, all-encompassing case in support 
of the position. The challenge here is not only to build an argument for panpsychism 
which may appeal to dispositionalists (who are traditionally powerfully opposed to 
panpsychism, due to their beliefs concerning the metaphysics of properties); rather, 
the point is to widen and strengthen the resources that the panpsychist (who is already 
convinced by the traditional argument) has to support her view. Thus understood, the 
upshot of Reconciliation is essentially to give to the traditional panpsychist the possi-
bility to subscribe to a new, strong argument to support her view, without forcing her 
to give up on the resources that she already has (namely, the argument from categori-
cal properties) — thus producing a comprehensive case in favour of her view.
This appears to be especially relevant if we consider the dialectic of the current 
debate on the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Even in panpsychism-sympathetic 
circles, there might be detected a certain tendency to regard the view primarily as 
a less problematic alternative to the more established (but problematic) dualist and 
physicalist options; rather than as a positive proposal, which is desirable per se 
(that is, in isolation from the two competing views) — this trend has been recently 
registered by Maung (2019). It is no coincidence that, when it comes to present-
ing their view, Russellian advocates first resort to conceivability arguments against 
physicalism (showing that the view cannot withstand the challenge), and then claim 
that panpsychism is a better and more cogent theory, as it is able to maintain the 
fundamentality of mentality (cf., e.g., Seager, 1995; Chalmers, 2015: 249–252) — 
thus taking the conceivability argument (and the consequent failure of physicalism) 
to constitute the key motivation for even considering panpsychism (Maung, 2019: 
159).3 In this direction, it seems clear that constituting a unitary panpsychist front 
(which would retain the traditional case for the view and subsume Mørch’s new 
argument) represents a pivotal objective for the Russellian advocate — and would 
signal a clear step change for the hopes of the view in the philosophical arena.
4  H. Taylor’s Challenge to the Identity View
In a recent paper, H. Taylor (2018) has challenged the common belief that the 
Identity theory and the pure powers theory are distinct views — just like Mørch, 
he also takes the Identity theory to be the view that “the property, the disposi-
tionality and the qualitativity of the property are all identical” (2018: 1424), fol-
lowing Martin (1997: 216), Marting & Heil (1999: 46–47), and Strawson (2008). 
Thus, Taylor argues that if one takes a close look at their proposed accounts of 
dispositions and qualities, the advocates of the Identity theory and the pure pow-
ers theorists turn out to share the very same views on properties — meaning that 
3 Goff seems to be aware of this trend and, in some of his recent works (cf. 2016: 283–284; 2017: 
162–168), he endeavours to emphasise that panpsychism has other significant virtues such as elegance, 
unity, and parsimony, which make the view appealing — even though he himself presents the capacity of 
panpsychism to provide a satisfactory response to the conceivability argument (and to the exclusion argu-
ment against dualism (cf. Kim, 1989)) as one of the main assets of the view (Goff, 2017: 1).
 Philosophia
1 3
the two theories “are not distinct” (2018: 1438). To this extent, he holds that this 
follows from the understanding that the two positions have of the metaphysics of 
properties, and in particular from a) their analysis of what qualities are, b) their 
stance on what qualities are not, and c) a shared commitment to the complete 
powerfulness of properties — let us consider the claims in order.
First of all, Taylor argues that, on most accounts of what a quality is, a) 
both pure powers and Identity theorists will agree that properties are quali-
ties. Heil and Martin characterise qualities as the “ways things are” (Heil, 
2010, 2012: 59), and being qualitative as being “really ‘there’ in the object” 
(Martin, 1996: 74) (cf. also Jacobs, 2011). The same account of properties is 
held by the powers theorists: dispositionalists such as Molnar (2003: 99) say 
that properties are ‘really’ in the object — for example, fragility is an ‘actual’ 
property of the glass, it is ‘really there’ in the glass. An example might help 
(cf. Jaworski, 2016). When we consider a diamond, and we focus on its cate-
gorical features, we can say that the diamond is essentially hard, or that it has 
a tetrahedral arrangement of carbon atoms essentially — such that in every 
possible world a diamond is hard, and has a tetrahedral arrangement of carbon 
atoms. Conceived of in this way, categorical properties are those features of 
objects which are always and essentially possessed by the objects in ques-
tion, independently of the circumstances: they are really there, in the object. 
Now, if being ‘really there in the object’ and being ‘the way things are’, are 
the individuating traits of categorical properties, then powers, as conceived of 
by the pure powers theorists, will also be fully fledged categorical properties, 
such that, e.g., fragility is always and essentially a property of fragile objects 
— it is just the way fragile objects are: fragile.
Secondly, Taylor does not only claim that the two views agree on what 
qualities are and conceive of properties in the same way, but also suggests 
that b) the Identity theorists and the pure powers theorists both reject David 
Armstrong’s characterisation of categorical properties. Armstrong defines 
categorical properties as non-dispositional properties, claiming that qualities 
and powers are “just different” (2005: 315). However, Identity theorists, Tay-
lor claims, do not characterise categorical properties as non-dispositional, as 
Armstrong does, but rather they understand the qualitative in terms of “real, 
actual features of objects” (2018: 1430) — as per a). Consider again the dia-
mond example. When we look at a diamond, we can describe it in various 
ways: we can say that it is hard, that it would be able to scratch glass it is 
was pressed onto it, and that it has tetrahedral arrangement of carbon atoms. 
Now, according to the Identity theorist, these three descriptions are “of 
numerically one and the same property”, such that “the diamond’s hardness 
= the diamond’s power to scratch glass = the diamond’s having a tetrahedral 
arrangement of carbon atoms” (Jaworski, 2016: 54). This is to say that, under 
the Identity view of properties, categorical properties (such as the diamond’s 
hardness or its being constituted by tetrahedral arrangement of carbon atoms) 
and dispositional properties (the diamond’s power to scratch glass), are one 
and the same thing, just considered under different aspects — thus they are not 
numerically distinct, separate properties (or parts of properties).
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Finally, pure powers theorists believe that the whole nature of a property 
is powerful, that is, that there is no aspect or part of a property which is not 
powerful. But Identity theorists must also be committed to this, as they believe 
that “properties are identical with powers” (Taylor, 2018: 1434) and that dispo-
sitionality and categoricality are one and the same thing. Thus, c) both views 
endorse a characterisation of the nature of properties as entirely powerful, such 
that there is no part or aspect of a property that is independent of its disposi-
tional nature.
To sum up, Identity theorists and Pure powers advocates share the same view of 
the metaphysics of properties, such that they both accept
Taylorian metaphysics of properties (TMP): Properties are powers, and they 
are ‘qualities’ in the sense of real, actual features of the object, i.e. features that 
are always and essentially there in the object — such that the whole nature of 
the property is powerful, that is, properties have no nature independent of their 
dispositional nature.
While they both deny
Armstrongian metaphysics of properties (AMP): Properties are powers, and 
they are ‘qualities’ in the Armstrongian sense of ‘qualities’, that is as ‘non-
dispositional properties’ — such that, it is not the case that the whole nature of 
the property is powerful, that is, properties have some nature that is independ-
ent of their dispositional nature.
5  Taylorian metaphysics of properties and Reconciliation
On the one hand, Mørch claims that only by adopting the Identity view, following 
Marting & Heil (1999) and Strawson (2008), can one subscribe to both the argument 
from causation and the argument from categorical properties (i.e. Reconciliation) — 
while the pure powers theorist must view the argument from categorical properties 
as unacceptable. On the other hand, it follows from Taylor’s argument that the Iden-
tity theorist has the exact same resources as the pure powers theorist — as they both 
accept TMP, and they both deny AMP. Prima facie, then, it seems that, if Taylor is 
right, Reconciliation (for how it is defended by Mørch in 2014, 2018, 2020) must be 
false — as it is not the case that, via the commitment to the Identity view, one can 
hold both the argument from causation and the argument from categorical proper-
ties. Indeed, if Taylor is right and the Identity view is identical to the pure powers 
view, then the Identity theorist should not be able to accept the argument from cat-
egorical properties (just like the pure powers advocate) — and thus Reconciliation 
fails. Let us investigate the matter in more detail and determine whether this initial 
indication is verified.
It seems that if one buys Taylor’s conception of categorical properties as 
(merely) the “ways things are” (Heil, 2010,  2012: 59), thus attributing cate-
goricality also to dispositional properties (i.e. TMP), one can make sense of 
Premise 1 of the argument from categorical properties even from the radical 
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dispositionalist’s standpoint. With this first premise, Mørch wants to defend the 
view that all extrinsic/relational/structural properties need some sort of intrin-
sic ground (i.e. Categoricalism) — otherwise, physical reality would end up 
being populated exclusively by abstract mathematical entities (i.e. the ‘Pythag-
orean reductio’, Mørch, 2018: 1076; cf. also Lowe, 2006; Armstrong, 1997). As 
already mentioned in Sections 2 and 3.2, the commitment to Categoricalism is 
traditionally taken as the main point of contention between pure powers theo-
rists, who claim that properties are essentially and entirely constituted by the 
nomic role they play (Bird, 2007; 2012); and Russellian monists, who believe 
in (phenomenal) categorical properties that ground all the physical structure of 
the natural world. In a word, the pure powers advocate believes that there are 
only dispositional properties while the Russellian monist also allows for cat-
egorical properties (and claims these to be phenomenal). Now, if one takes the 
view that categoricality and dispositionality are, in fact, identical (as in TMP), 
then it seems that the dispositionalist can agree that all physical structure is 
instantiated by (individuals with) categorical properties, on the grounds that 
all dispositional properties have a categorical aspect of some sort — and this 
would seem to vindicate Premise 1 of the argument from categorical properties.
However, even if this kind of Identity theory approach (i.e. TMP) saves 
the first premise of the traditional argument, it threatens the second one. As 
it is presented in Mørch’s most recent works (2018, 2020), Premise 2 of the 
argument from categorical properties (Mental categoricity) states that “[t]
he only categorical properties whose nature we can know, or positively con-
ceive of, are mental properties” (Mørch, 2020: 280. Emphasis added.). Now, 
Mørch does not offer an extensive defence of Mental categoricity in either 
2018 or 2020, but she does so in 2014. Indeed, in 2014, the main argument 
that Mørch provides for the premise draws on the basic Russellian claim that 
science tells us only about the logico-mathematical structure of physical real-
ity and remains silent with regard to the intrinsic nature of the physical world 
— a claim generally known as ‘Structuralism about physics’ (Russell, 1927; 
Seager, 2006: 136; Alter & Nagasawa, 2015: 425; Mørch, 2014: 28).4 This is 
to say that, while it fully describes the dispositional structure of the world, 
physical science does not tell us anything about the categorical properties that 
ground all reality. But if one buys the Identity view (i.e. TMP), then each and 
every property is at the same time dispositional and categorical — and indeed 
categoricality, dispositionality, and the property at issue are all identical. 
Now, if physical science provides us with a full account of the nomic struc-
ture of reality, and dispositionality and categoricality are identical, it follows 
with necessity that physics indeed provides us with a full account of categori-
cality. And again, as dispositionality and categoricality are also identical with 
the property at issue, according to the Identity theory, physical science would 
be perfectly able to disclose everything there is to know about that property. 
But clearly the latter conclusion is at odds with the basic metaphysical outline 
4 This corresponds to the negative aspect of Russellian Monism, as presented by Goff (2017: 17) — see 
Section 2 of the present paper.
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of Russellian monism, given that it implies that the (alleged) inscrutables are 
perfectly well captured by physical science. Further, it implies that scientific 
enquiry will reveal the categorical aspect of physical properties and of mental 
properties in just the same way — which means that, under this account, men-
tal properties will not have any kind of privilege in terms of categoricality. 
To the conclusion that, if the panpsychist adopts the conception of properties 
which is at the core of the Identity theory (i.e. TMP) (which is the same one 
of the pure powers view, as per Taylor’s argument), she will be forced to deny 
Mental categoricity (i.e. Premise 2 of the argument from categorical proper-
ties), and thus she will be forced to abandon her subscription to the tradi-
tional case for Russellian panpsychism — thus denying Reconciliation.5
To sum up, embracing the Identity view’s understanding of categorical properties 
(i.e. TMP) would compel the aspirant Russellian monist to deny Premise 2 of the 
traditional argument from categorical properties (Mental categoricity), as it would 
not be the case that mental properties are the only categorical properties whose 
nature we can know, or positively conceive of. Thus, in light of TMP, we can say 
that Reconciliation, as it is defended by Mørch in her recent production, is false — 
as it is not the case that, by adopting the Identity view, one can hold both the argu-
ment from causation and the argument from categorical properties.6
6  Salvaging Reconciliation: The Compound View
As we have seen, if Taylor is right about the Identity view’s and the pure powers 
view’s shared understanding of the metaphysics of properties (i.e. TMP), Reconcili-
ation (as Mørch presents it in her recent production) is false — as the adoption of 
the Identity view is incompatible with the traditional case for Russellian panpsy-
chism. Now, I believe there might be found a way to salvage Reconciliation — and 
that is via the adoption of a view which is quite closely related (but not identical) to 
Mørch’s Identity view, namely, the Compound view.
6.1  The Compound view and Reconciliation*
We have seen how the Armstrong-inspired view of categorical properties as 
non-dispositional (i.e. AMP) is incompatible with the Identity view that they are 
5 The same reasoning might also be applied to Premise II (Mental causation). If categoricality and dis-
positionality were identical (i.e. TMP), and if we had a complete grasp on dispositionality and categori-
cality alike, then we should be able to know (or positively conceive of) causal powers that are not mental 
(thus denying Reconciliation).
6 In one of her recent papers, Mørch entertains the eventuality of the Identity view being proven inco-
herent, and claims that “[I]f so, then even though panpsychists who endorsed the original case from cat-
egorical properties would have been wrong to say that phenomenal properties are categorical, they would 
still have been right to say that phenomenal properties are intrinsic” (2018: 1080). However, she fails to 
provide a detailed proposal for how the panpsychist could salvage the attempt of reconciliation. In this 
direction, I think that the account that I will offer in Section 6 may precisely accommodate Mørch’s sug-
gestion of considering phenomenal properties ‘intrinsic’ — thus achieving reconciliation, without having 
to appeal to the Identity view.
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completely powerful (i.e. TMP). And, in all fairness, Mørch seems to be resist-
ant to the idea of conceiving of categorical properties as opposed to dispositional 
properties (cf. 2020: 280) — that is, to AMP. However, I believe that, by focus-
sing on what I previously called the Armstrongian metaphysics of properties, we 
can elaborate a view which will prove successful where the Identity view failed, 
that is, in reconciling the argument from categorical properties with the argument 
from causation.
This being said, if we elaborate on AMP, we get to an understanding of the 
nature of properties such that
Compound view: each property has separate, purely dispositional and 
purely categorical parts — such that each property has categorical parts 
essentially, and dispositional parts essentially, but neither the categoricality 
nor the dispositionality exhaust the full nature of the property.
To illustrate how the Compound advocate conceives of properties, one can pic-
ture the dial of a watch (also known as ‘face’): half of the dial is the semi-circular 
section that goes from the 12 h marker to the 6 h marker (from now on, just 12 
and 6), the other half is the section from 6 to 12, and the two parts together form 
a compound, namely, the dial — which cannot be conceived of without any of 
the two sections (that is, take away the 6–12 section, and your watch does not 
have a face anymore, and the same goes for the 12–6 section). Accordingly, under 
the Compound view, each and every property is divided into two separate parts, 
one is purely dispositional, the other is purely categorical, and these two separate 
parts, taken together (i.e. the compound of the two parts) make up the intrinsic 
character of the property at issue — such that both parts are essential to the prop-
erty, but none of them exhausts the nature of the property.
Now, the compound view is clearly different from the Identity view (that is, 
the view based on TMP) as it holds that categoricality and dispositionality are 
not identical — it also denies the complete powerfulness claim (that is, no part of 
a property is non-dispositional) (i.e. c)). However, the view is still different from 
categoricalism, as it claims that a property has some dispositional parts essen-
tially, and also from the pure powers view, as it claims that a property has some 
categorical parts essentially. Having introduced the Compound view, let us now 
reformulate Reconciliation accordingly:
Reconciliation*: if one subscribes to the Compound view, she can hold both 
the argument from categorical properties and the argument from causation 
without contradiction.
Now, by claiming that properties have both irreducibly dispositional and cat-
egorical parts (that is, the Compound view), one can retain both Premise 1 of 
the traditional argument, as it is true that every property has a categorical part 
essentially, and Premise I of the argument from causation, as it is true that every 
property has a dispositional part essentially. Further, prima facie, it also seems 
that, by adopting the Compound view, one can hold both Premise II of the argu-
ment from causation, and retain the reasoning behind Premise 2 of the traditional 
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argument — and thus Reconciliation* seems to be vindicated. Yet, things are not 
as straightforward as they might appear.
6.2  The Compound view and the Threat of Epiphenomenalism
In Section  5, we have seen that Reconciliation fails because the Identity view is 
incompatible with the traditional case for Russellian panpsychism. Thus, in Sec-
tion 6.1, I have advanced a new formulation of the claim (i.e. Reconciliation*), that 
is, basing the reconciliation attempt not on the Identity view (which elaborates on 
TMP) but on the Compound view (which endorses AMP). Now, even though the 
Compound view does not encounter the same difficulties of the Identity view (that 
is, it is not incompatible with Premise 2), it might still entail some undesirable con-
sequences for Mørch’s argument from causation — and, in particular, for Premise 
II. Specifically, adopting the Compound view might make Mørch’s argument from 
causation entail epiphenomenalism — which would (arguably) make the subscrip-
tion to the argument altogether undesirable.
Let us consider again Mørch’s reasoning for Mental dispositionality, that is, 
Premise II of the argument from causation. She claims that the relationship that 
holds between ‘feeling pain’ and ‘trying to avoid it’, a paradigmatic example from 
our phenomenology of will, can qualify as a genuine relation of causal necessity 
(which is defined via the principle of inconceivability) — such that it seems incon-
ceivable for a subject in pain not to try to avoid the pain (ceteris paribus). In particu-
lar, Mørch contends that the fact that pain makes us try to avoid it seems to be due 
to the nature of the pain, that is, to the intrinsic character of the property (i.e. pain).7
Let us now consider how Premise II may fare when the Compound view is 
applied to the view. (Before moving on, let us bear in mind that, according to the 
Compound advocate, the intrinsic character of the property ‘pain’ is constituted by 
two parts, one purely dispositional, and one purely categorical (i.e. the ‘feeling of 
pain’) — such that, each property is essentially dispositional and essentially categor-
ical at the same time.)
At first glance, the claim that it is the intrinsic nature of pain that disposes 
us to try to avoid it, such that phenomenal properties have an essentially dis-
positional nature, might seem controversial. For instance, Goff believes that if 
there were a dispositional aspect to the intrinsic character of phenomenal prop-
erties, this should have been introspectively apparent (2018: 1092). Indeed, he 
maintains that there seems to be nothing incoherent with the claim that “there 
could be certain odd creatures whose pain produces attraction compulsions and 
whose pleasure produces avoidance compulsions” (Goff, 2018: 1090) — such 
that Mørch’s proposed relation (between ‘feeling pain’ and ‘trying to avoid it’) 
does not meet the standards of the inconceivability principle for causation. In this 
direction, Goff suggests that one way Mørch can salvage her proposal is to say 
that “there are some non-phenomenal features of pain that, as it were, activate its 
7 Bearing in mind that it is still doubtful whether the dispositional essentialist would accept Mental cau-
sation for this very reason — refer to footnote n. 2.
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causal capacity” (2018: 1091). Now, this is precisely what the Compound view 
allows her to do. In fact, the Compound view lends support to Mørch’s claim that 
it is the intrinsic nature of pain that is responsible for the bearer’s trying to avoid 
it, since it allows that the intrinsic character of pain is composed of two separate 
parts, one categorical and one dispositional, only the latter of which disposes us 
to try to avoid pain (along with Goff’s suggestion). Again, we should bear in mind 
that the main difference between how the Identity advocate and the Compound 
theorist conceive of properties (that is, the contrast between TMP and AMP) is 
that, while in the Identity view the whole property is powerful (such that there is 
no part of the property which is independent of the dispositional nature), in the 
Compound view this is not the case — and the categorical part of the property is 
causally inert.
This being said, if by positing a purely dispositional part of the intrinsic character 
of properties (which activates their causal capacities), Mørch’s proposal (read as an 
instance of the Compound view) might respond to Goff’s scepticism (and respect 
the inconceivability principle of causation), it also brings about a major problem. In 
fact, if it is only the purely dispositional part of the intrinsic character of the property 
that activates the causal capacities of the property (in the case of pain, the ‘trying to 
avoid’), this now means that the qualitative (that is, the purely categorical) part of 
pain is irrelevant to our trying to avoid it — as the causal work is entirely done by 
the dispositional part of the property. On this account, then, one might worry that 
we would try to avoid the pain even if its phenomenology were quite different from 
what it is, or even if there were no ‘what it is like’ to pain at all. Again, this fol-
lows from the fact that, under the Compound view, it is not the case that the whole 
property is powerful (vis-à-vis the Identity view); rather, by definition, the purely 
categorical part of the property is causally inefficacious. To the conclusion that it is 
indeed inconceivable, as Mørch wants to say, that when we bear the property ‘pain’ 
we do not ‘try to avoid it’, but this is not due to the qualitative part of the property 
(i.e. the ‘feeling of pain’), but to the dispositional part of the property.
If this is reasonable, prima facie, it is hard to see how one can avoid the threat of 
epiphenomenalism: if the dispositional parts of (the intrinsic character of) proper-
ties are sufficient to fully explain the physical facts, then it is hard to see why phe-
nomenality is not just ‘along for the ride’.
In this direction, Robert Howell (2015) has similarly argued that Russellian Mon-
ism (in general) entails epiphenomenalism. He argues that “even if phenomenal 
properties cause things on the Russellian Monism picture, they do not cause things 
in virtue of their phenomenal nature” (Howell, 2015: 28). Let us go through How-
ell’s modified causal exclusion argument (2015: 32) — which, interestingly, seems 
to be assuming (without acknowledging it) the Compound view as the default meta-
physical position for Russellian Monism:
A. There are two distinct and separable aspects of Russellian properties, those that 
ground phenomenal resemblance relations and those that ground resemblances 
between causal profiles;
B. All physical events have sufficient causes in virtue of those aspects that ground 




C. The aspects of RM properties that ground phenomenal resemblances make no 
unique causal contribution to the physical world.
Now, Howell’s Premise A seems perfectly in line with the general overview 
of the Compound view, that is, that properties have separate, purely dispositional 
and purely categorical parts, with their respective prerogatives. Then, Premise B 
outlines what I have previously argued, that is, that, under the Compound view, 
properties dispose their bearers not in virtue of the totality of their intrinsic char-
acter (bearing in mind that Compound properties are not wholly powerful), but 
in virtue of the purely dispositional parts of their intrinsic character — such that 
‘pain’ disposes its bearer to ‘try to avoid’ not in virtue of the ‘feeling of pain’, 
but in virtue of its purely dispositional part. Finally, if Premise A and Premise 
B obtain (as they do in Mørch’s proposal read as an instance of the Compound 
view), then the phenomenal parts of properties (e.g. the ‘feeling of pain’ for the 
property ‘pain’) are entirely inefficacious towards the physical world (i.e. C) — 
thus qualifying as epiphenomenal.
In conclusion, we have seen how Reconciliation is entirely off the table (as the 
Identity view is incompatible with the traditional case for Russellian panpsychism), 
while Reconciliation*, on the other hand, is not incoherent. However, it seems that 
if we pursue Reconciliation*, that is, if we try to reconcile the traditional argument 
from categorical properties and the argument from causation by adopting the Com-
pound view, we might end up with a (prima facie rather undesirable) picture where 
the feeling of pain (i.e. the purely categorical part of the property) is completely 
inefficacious in disposing the bearers to try to avoid pain — in a word, a picture 
where phenomenal (parts of) properties are epiphenomenal.
6.3  Two Strategies against Epiphenomenalism
We have seen how Reconciliation* may constitute an undesirable solution for 
the Russellian panpsychist, as, under the Compound view, phenomenal quali-
ties turn out to be epiphenomenal. Now, the challenge is to determine whether 
there exist some strategies that can be adopted by the panpsychist to retain 
Reconciliation* (and thus the Compound view), without incurring epiphenom-
enalism. In this direction, Alter and Coleman (2020: 233) argue that there are 
essentially two ways in which the Russellian monist can reply to the epiphe-
nomenalist objection. These are the necessitarian strategy and the compatibilist 
strategy — let us now consider the strategies and evaluate whether the advocate 
of Reconciliation* is metaphysically allowed to pursue them.
First of all, the necessitarian strategy consists of denying that the two aspects 
(read: parts) of a property, as posited by Howell and by the Compound view advo-
cate “are modally separable in the way the modified exclusion argument requires” 
(Alter & Coleman, 2020: 236). Specifically, the necessitarian Russellian panpsychist 
argues that metaphysical necessitation from the phenomenality to dispositionality 
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‘does not exhaust the picture of the intimate relationship that ties the two aspects 
together’, and claims that the metaphysical necessitation functions also in the oppo-
site direction. It is clear that a metaphysical necessitation from the dispositional 
aspect to the phenomenal aspect of a property dodges Howell’s modified exclusion 
argument and thus avoids epiphenomenalism — but it comes with a high price, as 
Howell himself remarks (2015: 36–37). In fact, positing such a necessitation rules 
out all the conceivability, zombie-style arguments against physicalism: if there is an 
entailment from dispositional to phenomenal, then a zombie world is not metaphysi-
cally possible. In sum, I do not think that a such conceived picture (where the purely 
dispositional part of the property metaphysically necessitates the purely categori-
cal one) is one that the traditionalist Russellian panpsychist would easily accept.8 
(Moreover, I suspect that postulating a metaphysical necessitation from the dispo-
sitional aspect to the phenomenal one would make the position ultimately collapse 
into the already discussed Identity view — with all the related difficulties.)9
Secondly, the compatibilist can resist the inference from two different categori-
cal properties playing the same grounding role — “either across or within worlds” 
(Alter & Coleman, 2020: 235) — to the conclusion that they are not causally effi-
cacious. To do this, the compatibilist can appeal to the contingency of the laws of 
nature, and say that these laws fix which properties do the grounding work in which 
worlds — and thus the contribution that categorical properties make to physical cau-
sation. However, if the advocate of Reconciliation* (and thus the Compound view 
advocate) were to adopt this compatibilist strategy, then she would inevitably dis-
tance herself from the dispositionalists — and from Mørch’s argument from causa-
tion. In fact, the compatibilist strategy explicitly builds upon a Humean picture of 
reality (where causal regularities are viewed as contingent), while dispositionalism, 
in both its radical (i.e. pure powers view) and moderate (i.e. dispositional essential-
ism) form, is generally opposed to Humeanism. In this direction, if the advocate of 
Reconciliation* adopted the compatibilist strategy, she will be (arguably) forced to 
renounce Premise I of the argument from causation, which is accepted by disposi-
tionalists but is strongly at odds with the regularity theory (Hume, 1739–40; Lewis, 
1973) — and, for this very reason, Mørch herself rejects the Humean account of the 
laws of nature in defending her view (2017: 302; 2018: 1073; 2020: 276–277).
8 This is also suggested by Maung, who claims that given that much of the interest in panpsychism 
comes from the dissatisfaction with the traditional physicalists’ responses to the challenge of conceiv-
ability (and the capacity of panpsychism of providing a more convincing position on the matter), if the 
panpsychist ended up not being able to appeal to the zombie argument, it would not be clear anymore 
whether one is more justified in entertaining panpsychism than in assuming traditional physicalism 
(2019: 162).
9 I am aware that taking mutual metaphysical necessitation as a sufficient criterion for identity is highly 
contentious a claim — such that it is controversial whether mutual metaphysical necessitation from A 
to B and from B to A is sufficient for A to be identical with B. This being said, even if the necessitarian 
strategy would not make the view properly collapse into the Identity view, I believe it will still make the 
two effectively very similar with regard to the issue at hand.
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6.4  Is Reconciliation* Worth Epiphenomenalism?
We have seen in the previous section that, if the advocate of the Compound view 
adopts the necessitarian strategy (to avoid epiphenomenalism), she will distance 
herself from the traditional Russellian panpsychist, as she will be forced to posit 
a metaphysical necessitation from the dispositional part to the phenomenal part of 
the property — and thus Reconciliation* fails. On the other hand, if she goes for the 
compatibilist strategy, she will distance herself from the dispositionalist (and thus 
from the argument from causation), as she will be forced to accept that causal pow-
ers are not in things but are determined by laws of nature — and thus Reconcilia-
tion* fails. Therefore, there seems to be no obvious way the advocate of Reconcilia-
tion* (i.e. the Compound theorist) can avoid epiphenomenalism. At this stage, then, 
one question arises: given that Reconciliation is not viable (that is, the approach 
based on the TMP), is the entailment of epiphenomenalism so undesirable to make 
the panpsychist renounce Reconciliation* — and thus abandon the enterprise of rec-
onciling the two panpsychist arguments altogether? To this, my answer is: no, she 
should not abandon Reconciliation* — there are two reasons for this, one concep-
tual and another dialectical.
First of all, one might point out that the specific form of epiphenomenalism that 
is seen to follow from Reconciliation* is not a particularly concerning one. In par-
ticular, given that the phenomenal parts of properties may still be said to do some 
grounding work, the fact that they are not strictly causally efficacious should not be 
too concerning. That is to say that, while the qualitative parts are certainly epiphe-
nomenal (as they are causally inert and ‘epiphenomenalism’ is a causally-relevant 
notion), it still follows from the view that the property ‘pain’ disposes its bearers to 
‘trying to avoid’ in virtue of its intrinsic nature (where the qualitative part ‘feeling 
of pain’ is inefficacious but grounds the overall property ‘pain’ while the disposi-
tional part, in turn, is responsible for the causal work). An example might help illus-
trate the point. When we explain why gravity diminishes as 1 over distance squared, 
we note the mathematical fact that the surface area of a sphere grows as the square 
of radius. Now, this is not a causal power of spheres, but it does affect causal powers 
— or better, it grounds how they change. Thus, the surface area of the sphere is not 
just ‘along for the ride’.
In sum, the phenomenal part of the property is responsible for grounding the 
property, while the dispositional part of the property is responsible for activating 
the causal capacity of the property — thus both parts are essential to the property, 
and both parts play equally relevant roles (even though different roles) towards the 
contribution of the property to the structure of physical reality. Again, this does not 
mean that the phenomenal parts of properties are not epiphenomenal, for they are 
indeed (as they are causally inert); it means that this specific kind of epiphenom-
enalism is rather a benign one — phenomenal parts still contribute to the structure 
of physical reality (by grounding the properties they are parts of).
Secondly, a dialectical reason. As we have seen in Section 3.3, the argumentative 
importance of the reconciliation attempt should not be underestimated: if we man-
aged to find a way to allow the panpsychist to subscribe to a unitary position that 
would integrate the traditional case from categorical properties and Mørch’s original 
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dispositionalism-oriented argument, the overall case for panpsychism would be 
much strengthened — also in view of the alternative answers to the Hard Problem 
of Consciousness (as presented in Section 2). This is to say that, even though the 
entailment of (even a rather innocuous form of) epiphenomenalism might be per-
ceived as expensive (from a metaphysical point of view), I believe it is well worth 
the price.
7  Concluding Remarks
The main objective of this paper has been to question Mørch’s claim that the Iden-
tity theory allows us to subscribe both to the traditional argument for panpsychism 
and also to her own argument from causation — which I referred to as Reconcilia-
tion. To this extent, I argued that if one takes the Identity view of properties, which 
is built around an understanding of properties which I called the Taylorian meta-
physics of properties (TMP) (on the basis of Taylor, 2018), then the panpsychist 
will have to renounce  the traditional case for her view — as the resulting concep-
tion of the categorical properties is incompatible with Premise 3 of the argument 
from categorical properties. Then, I proposed to elaborate on an Armstrong-inspired 
conception of categorical properties (i.e. the Armstrongian metaphysics of proper-
ties (AMP)), which led to the consideration of the Compound view of properties. 
In this direction, I have demonstrated that if one buys the Compound view, one can 
reformulate the reconciliation strategy (i.e. Reconciliation*) such that the objective 
can be achieved — that is, one can consistently hold both panpsychist arguments 
without contradiction. Yet, even though Reconciliation* has been proven successful 
in its aims, it might entail the (apparently undesirable) consequence that the phe-
nomenal parts of properties are epiphenomenal. However, given that specific kind 
of epiphenomenalism that Reconciliation* brings about is not a threatening one (and 
seen the relevance of the overall enterprise), I concluded that one may well bite the 
bullet. Therefore, if my reasoning is correct, via the Compound view of properties, 
a strong, unitary panpsychist position is constituted — one by which Panpsychism 
can be defended as a positive proposal towards the solution of the Hard Problem of 
Consciousness (and not merely as an alternative to dualism and physicalism).
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